Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this timely

hearing.

And welcome, Ambassador Davies. We thank you for being here.

I look forward to hearing from you today, along with our panel of

expert witnesses later this morning.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, missile program, and

proliferation activities pose a threat to the United States national

security interests.

Over several decades, United States policymakers have attempted

to influence North Korea’s behavior through an array of

deterrent tools, including inducements and punitive measures. U.S.

officials have used diplomacy, energy assistance, financial sanctions,

and counterproliferation tools, including proactive interdiction

activities. Despite the varying combinations of tools, the

United States has failed to persuade the North Korean regime to

abandon its nuclear weapons program.

We know that North Korea continues to engage in a range of

illicit and proliferation-related activities to generate hard currency

to support the regime. Simultaneously, the situation for the North

Korean people has continued to deteriorate with rampant human

rights abuses, the continued expansion of North Korean prison

camps, and some analysts estimate they may hold as many as

200,000 political prisoners.

In addition, China continues to serve as North Korea’s primary

benefactor, accounting for nearly 60 percent of all North Korean

trade. Beijing remains Pyongyang’s main source of food and fuel.

United States policymakers have not been able to persuade China

that the costs of Beijing’s continued support for North Korea far

outweigh the perceived benefits. It is clear that we must redouble

our efforts in that regard.

I recognize that North Korea is a complex policy conundrum and

that there is no silver bullet solution. Yet, after nearly 20 years of

unsuccessful policies by successive administrations, it seems logical

to me that we ought to undertake a comprehensive review of our

North Korean strategy, including harnessing new tools to try to

crack the North Korean policy nut.

That is why I worked with Senator Menendez and other members

of this committee to move forward with the North Korean

Nonproliferation and Accountability Act, S. 298, which would

require the administration to review our approach to North Korea.

Undertaking such a review does not require abandoning diplomatic

efforts nor terminating sanctions. However, it necessitates that we

redouble efforts to think outside the box.

In recent months, it has become increasingly clear to me that

U.S. policymakers ought to pay closer attention to the nonmilitary

aspects of deterrence, including efforts to weaken and debilitate the

North Korean regime. In particular, we ought to do more to expose

the North’s brutality toward its own citizens as a means to influence

the Kim regime.

We also should promote the flow of information to the North

Korean people, including through our own Radio Free Asia broadcasts.

However, do not mistake my interests in the nonmilitary aspects

of deterrence as a call to abandon the military and security aspects

of our overall North Korea policy. I firmly believe that a robust

United States nuclear deterrent is essential to United States

security and it remains critical to maintaining our security commitments

to allies in the Asia-Pacific, including Japan and South

Korea. I know that Ambassador Joseph will speak to the importance

of our nuclear deterrent later during this hearing.

Ambassador Davies, I do look forward to hearing from you

regarding the administration’s strategy for confronting North

Korea, including our efforts this week at the Security Council on

a new sanctions resolution.

In addition, I look forward to hearing from you and all of our

expert witnesses about our capabilities to deter North Korean

provocations, options to elicit enhanced Chinese cooperation, and

opportunities to improve the lives of the North Korean people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, Ambassador, thank you for your testimony.

I hear of the things that you are working on and we thank you

for your work. And we understand this has been going on for 20

years and through many administrations. But when you talk about

verifiable denuclearization, it seems to me that we continue to go

in the opposite direction. And while we are talking today, I know,

at the Security Council about some additional sanctions, it feels to

me more like we are at a real crossroads, that this is not about additional

sanctions, but we are at a crossroads where if something

does not happen soon, there is no way that we can begin talking

about verifiable denuclearization.

Do you agree with that, or do you think, just adding on additional

pressures in the way we have been doing it, will work at

some point?

I know you talked about us ensuring that

Japan and South Korea and our other allies understand that we

are going to be there to protect them. And yet, I think you are

aware that we are not investing in modernization here in our own

country regarding our nuclear armament as we should. Does that

create any concerns with our allies that they see us really falling

behind and not doing the things in our own country to ensure that

that deterrence is there?

If you will, take a short stab.

So, you know, the mechanism that is funding

this nuclear activity uses illicit activities. And we have ways of

countering that. There are some people that are saying we should

call the entire North Korean Government as a money laundering

concern, and we could then enforce against third-party entities,

some of which might reside in China. Could you talk to us about

ways of getting involved in that illicit activity or stopping it so that

it is not funding what they are doing from a nuclear proliferation

standpoint and what your thoughts are about us actually being

involved in clamping down on entities that are allowing that money

to flow through?

But at present, they are not really doing what

needs to be done. I realize that some of the sanctions get at that.

But we are still not stopping the flow of money

to these nuclear activities from illicit concerns. And is there more

that we should be doing there?

I know my time is up. I want to say I do agree

with efforts to point out the human rights issues that are taking

place. I think that helps us build an even greater coalition. And I

would love to hear at some point about how we might influence the

citizens there through a better broadcast activity taking place

there.

But thank you for your testimony and I look forward to the rest

of your answers.

Just one brief question. You know, I listened to

you and I know that you are working hard and many people have

for many, many years. But I think you basically, in answering

some of the questions, have acquiesced and said, look, you know,

this is probably going to continue on and we do not see any real

changes and more pressure will be applied.

I am just curious. We have a situation with Iran where there is

a redline, and we have been pretty bellicose about the fact that we

would use military action to keep them from having nuclear weapons.

And yet, in Korea, equally nutty folks, human rights even

worse—and it is bad in Iran too. But why is it that we have a policy

in North Korea that is so different than what we have in Iran

when you have equally bellicose and, I would say, regimes that certainly

are rogue regimes? Why would we have such a differentiating

policy?

But they are certainly way past any kind of

redline that we would accept in Iran. They are certainly way

beyond anything that we as a country have stated publicly that we

would accept in Iran. So it seems to me that we have two very different

policies here. I am just curious why that is the case.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think that is a highly aspirational statement that does not

seem to be very based on reality today, but I thank you for your

optimism. And yet, I will go back to my original premise and certainly

would like to understand that more fully.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank each of you for your testimony and for your past

efforts regarding this issue.

It does not sound particularly hopeful to me, as I listen to each

of you, and I think you would agree with that.

Let me just ask this question. We had some discussions here

about our Libya intervention. Here we had a person that was

equally not a good person. We had a person who had done away

with weapons of mass destruction. We had a person that was working

with us with al-Qaeda, and we took him out when they did not

have weapons of mass destruction.

What kind of learning moment was that for, do you think, the

leadership of North Korea?

Any other comments? There was a point I was

trying to make at the time, but go ahead.

So I would just listen to earlier statements.

Again, I do not see any real—I cannot imagine why North Korea

would ever consider not going down the path they are going

because of recent experiences. And it does not sound like to me

that we have much of a way to deter that. I have not heard anybody

speak to how we really do that other than China. It sounds

like they are the only ones that have any cards that are worth

playing here other than something that I think our country really

does not want to engage in at this time. So it seems to me that

the entire issue around North Korea really is not us but China.

And I wonder if you might speak to that.

Ambassador.